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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Omar R. Rosales-Hensley was a backseat passenger in a car stopped by police officers.
The driver of the car was a man, and the other passenger was a woman in the front seat. After
the officers took the driver into custody, and a drug detection dog alerted on the car, officers
searched the car.

The officers found a syringe containing methamphetamine in the glove

compartment, and used syringes in a backpack that mostly contained women’s clothing, found in
the backseat. None of the passengers admitted to possessing the drugs and paraphernalia. The
officers searched Mr. Rosales-Hensley, finding a vial containing methamphetamine on his
person, and then arrested him. Mr. Rosales-Hensley filed a motion to suppress the evidence
from the warrantless search of his person. The district court denied the motion to suppress,
determining the search was a valid search incident to arrest.
In this appeal, Mr. Rosales-Hensley asserts the district court erred when it denied his
motion to suppress, because under the facts available at the time of the search, the officers did
not have probable cause to believe Mr. Rosales-Hensley had constructive possession of the
syringes in the backpack. Thus, the search of Mr. Rosales-Hensley’s person was not a valid
search incident to arrest.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
According to the district court’s findings of fact in its Memorandum Decision and Order
Denying Defendant’s Motion to Suppress (see R., pp.92-102), Officer McClure of the Pocatello
Police Department stopped the car in which Mr. Rosales-Hensley was a passenger, because the
tags on the plates had expired (see R., p.93). Michael Randall was driving the car, and the other
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passenger, Kelsey Beach, was seated in the front passenger seat. (See R., p.93.) Mr. RosalesHensley was seated in one of the rear passenger seats. (R., p.93.)
After Officer McClure initially contacted Mr. Randall and ran his name, he learned a
warrant had been issued for Mr. Randall’s arrest. (See R., p.93.) Officer McClure also saw “that
the passengers in the vehicle were moving around quite a bit.” (R., p.93.) The officer asked
dispatch to send additional officers to his location. (R., p.93.) Once the other officers arrived,
Officer McClure asked Mr. Randall to step out of the car, and took him into custody. (R., p.93.)
Mr. Randall was placed in the back of the patrol car, and Chubbuck Police Department officers
questioned him. (R., p.93.)
The district court found, “At some point, it is not clear when, McClure placed a phone
call to Melissa Cannidy, the registered owner of the vehicle.” (R., p.93.) Ms. Cannidy told
Officer McClure that the car was being used by a girl named Mariah, and the officer also spoke
with Mariah’s father. (R., p.93.) Mr. Randall stated that Mariah was his girlfriend, but was
unable to recall her address or her last name. (R., p.93.) The district court found that, “Because
of the problems with the vehicle’s registration and Randall’s inability to identify Mariah,
McClure was concerned that the vehicle may have been stolen.” (R., p.93.)
While the Chubbuck police officers were questioning Mr. Randall, Officer Bloxham of
the Pocatello Police Department questioned Mr. Rosales-Hensley and Ms. Beach about the
ownership of the car. (See R., pp.93-94.) Neither one could identify Mariah’s last name.
(R., p.94.) The district court found that Officer Bloxham “was certified as a drug recognition
expert” at the time of the questioning and at the time of the motion to suppress hearing, and that
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Officer Bloxham “testified that Hensley ‘exhibited several signs and indicators and symptoms of
being under the influence of a central nervous system stimulant.’”1 (R., p.94.)
Officer Bloxham then contacted Corporal Lacey, who arrived on scene with a drug
detection dog. (See R., p.94.) The drug detection dog alerted at the driver’s side headlight of the
car. (See R., p.94.) The officers searched the car, finding a hypodermic syringe in the glove
compartment. (See R., p.94.) The syringe contained a liquid that tested presumptively positive
for methamphetamine. (See R., p.94.) According to the district court, “Used syringes were also
recovered in a backpack that, although it contained mostly women’s clothing, was located in the
backseat next to Hensley.” (R., p.94.)
The district court found, “Upon further questioning, none of the passengers admitted to
possessing the drugs and paraphernalia, so both Hensley and Beach were searched.” (R., p.94.)
When they searched Mr. Rosales-Hensley, officers found a black neoprene cell phone armband,
containing a small vial with a substance that tested positive for methamphetamine.

(See

R., p.94.) The officers then arrested Mr. Rosales-Hensley at the scene. (See R., p.94.)
The State charged Mr. Rosales-Hensley by Prosecuting Attorney’s Information with
possession of a controlled substance, methamphetamine, felony, I.C. § 37-2732(c)(1).
(R., pp.38-39.) He entered a not guilty plea. (See R., p.54.)
Mr. Rosales-Hensley then filed a Motion to Suppress, requesting an order “prohibiting
the State of Idaho from introducing or attempting to introduce at trial in this matter any evidence
which was discovered as a result [of] the detention and search of the Defendant.” (R., pp.68-69.)
Mr. Rosales-Hensley asserted he “was detained and his person searched without reasonable

1

The district court refers to Mr. Rosales-Hensley throughout its order denying the motion to
suppress as “Hensley.”
3

suspicion or probable cause to support the detention or search.” (R., p.68.) He asserted his
detention and the search of the vehicle was in violation of his rights “under the 4 th and 14th
Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 13 of the Idaho
Constitution.” (See R., p.68.)
The district court conducted a hearing on the motion to suppress, where Officer McClure,
Officer Bloxham and Corporal Lacey testified. (See R., p.78.) Mr. Rosales-Hensley relied upon
the affidavit of probable cause showing he was searched without a warrant. (Tr. Feb. 27, 2018,
p.5, L.14 – p.6, L.1; see R., pp.15-16.) The district court then directed the parties to file briefs in
the matter. (See R., pp.78-79.)
In his Brief in Support of Motion to Suppress (see R., pp.80-86), Mr. Rosales-Hensley
asserted: “The items found on the Defendant’s person were the product of an unlawful search of
his person in violation of his constitutional right against unreasonable searches. The search of
the Defendant was not supported by a search warrant or an exception to the search warrant
requirement.” (R., p.81.) He asserted the search “was not a Terry frisk2 and could not be
justified as one.” (R., p.82.)
Mr. Rosales-Hensley also addressed the search incident to arrest exception to the warrant
requirement, asserting he “was not arrested prior to the search and any such arrest, if it had
occurred, would have been unlawful as there was no probable cause to support an arrest.”
(R., p.83.) He asserted the search of his person was not a valid search incident to arrest, because
he had not been arrested at the time of the search. (See R., p.83.) Mr. Rosales-Hensley then
asserted, “even if there had been an arrest, there was not probable cause to support an arrest.”
(R., p.83.) “Officer Bloxham stated that it was a policy to arrest all occupants of a vehicle if

2

See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
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drugs were found in the vehicle and nobody claimed responsibility for them.”

(R., p.83.)

“However, the basis for an arrest must be the actual existence of probable cause that the
individual being arrested committed the offense, not a blanket policy that everyone in a car will
be arrested if nobody takes responsibility for a controlled substance or paraphernalia.”
(R., p.83.)
Because Mr. Rosales-Hensley did not have actual possession of the syringes, he asserted
“an analysis of constructive possession must be undertaken.” (See R., pp.83-84.) Mr. RosalesHensley then discussed the legal standards for proving constructive possession, and for probable
cause. (See R., p.84.) He stated, “In order to prove constructive possession, knowledge and
control of the controlled substance must each be independently proven beyond a reasonable
doubt by either circumstantial or direct evidence.” (R., p.84 (citing State v. Seitter, 127 Idaho
356, 360 (1995); State v. Southwick, 158 Idaho 173, 178 (Ct. App. 2014); State v. Betancourt,
151 Idaho 635, 638 (Ct. App. 2011); State v. Rozajewski, 130 Idaho 644, 647 (Ct. App. 1997).)
Further, “When multiple people occupy a vehicle, constructive possession cannot be inferred
from the mere fact that a defendant at some point occupied the vehicle in which contraband was
found.” (R., p.84 (citing State v. Gomez, 126 Idaho 700, 706 (Ct. App. 1994); State v. Maland,
124 Idaho 537 (Ct. App. 1993); State v. Burnside, 115 Idaho 882, 885 (Ct. App. 1989).)
Mr. Rosales-Hensley asserted that, in the instant case, “there was no probable cause to
believe that the Defendant was in constructive possession of any of the syringes that were found
in the vehicle. (R., p.84.) “In other words, the facts do not support a reasonable conclusion that
the Defendant had knowledge of the syringes and/or controlled them or had an intent to control
them.” (R., pp.84-85.) He “was not the driver of the vehicle,” but “had been seated in the back
seat and, therefore, did not have control of the premises where the items were found.” (R., p.85.)
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“One syringe was found in the glove box, in the front part of the vehicle,” and “[t]he other
syringes were found inside a backpack which had female clothing in it.”

(R., p.85.)

Mr. Rosales-Hensley noted that “Ms. Beach was the only female in the car and she had been
seated in the front passenger seat.” (R., p.85.) He asserted: “That put her as the only reasonable
person, under the circumstances, to have had control and knowledge of the items in the
backpack. It also put her as the person who would have been closest to the syringe found in the
glove compartment and with ready access to the glove box.” (R., p.85.)
Mr. Rosales-Hensley asserted, “Under such circumstances and using an objective
standard, the facts known to the officers would not have led ‘a reasonable person of ordinary
care and prudence to believe or entertain an honest and strong presumption that’ the Defendant
was guilty of possessing the contraband found in the vehicle.” (R., p.85 (quoting State v. Julian,
129 Idaho 133, 136 (1996).) Thus, he asserted, “Because the Defendant was not under arrest
and, even if he was, an arrest was not supported by probable cause, the search of the Defendant’s
person cannot be justified under the search incident to arrest doctrine.” (R., p.85.)
The State filed a Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Suppress.
(R., pp.87-91.) The district court subsequently issued its Memorandum Decision and Order
Denying Defendant’s Motion to Suppress. (R., pp.92-102.) The district court characterized
Mr. Rosales-Hensley as arguing “primarily that the search of his person was not legal because it
was not incident to a lawful arrest.” (R., p.95.) The district court determined: “Because the
Court finds that the search of Hensley’s person was a search incident to a lawful arrest, the Court
need not consider whether the search of Hensley’s person was valid as a Terry frisk.” (R., p.95.)
The district court stated: “Where an officer conducts a search after probable cause has
arisen, but before the defendant is formally placed under arrest, the fact that the search precedes
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the formal arrest even by several minutes does not necessarily render the search illegal. All that
is required in such cases is that the ‘search and arrest are substantially contemporaneous, and
[that] the fruits of the search are not required to establish probable cause for the arrest.’”
(R., p.96 & n.14 (quoting State v. Chapman, 146 Idaho 346, 351 (Ct. App. 2008)).)
The district court then determined, “The present case is very similar to State v. Zentner,
[134 Idaho 508 (Ct. App. 2000)], which discusses the search of a defendant based upon
constructive possession that was only valid if the underlying arrest was also valid.” (R., p.97.)
The district court indicated the officers arrested Mr. Rosales-Hensley based on the syringes in
the backpack found in the rear seat of the car. (See R., p.98.) After discussing Zentner (see
R., pp.97-99), the district court determined, “The problem with the cases presented by Hensley is
that they discuss constructive possession within the realm of the sufficiency of evidence
necessary to sustain a conviction at trial, and not an analysis of constructive possession sufficient
to give rise to probable cause to arrest” (R., p.100). The district court also noted the evidence
Mr. Rosales-Hensley sought to suppress was in his actual possession, and constructive
possession “is therefore only relevant in this case as it relates to probable cause to arrest.” (See
R., pp.100-01.)
The district court recounted the “significant observations” made by the officers before the
search: (1) “Lacey’s drug detection canine alerted to the presence of illegal narcotics within the
vehicle”; (2) “drugs and paraphernalia were actually recovered within that vehicle”; (3) “as was
the case in Zentner, McClure viewed a significant amount of movement by the passengers in the
car after he had initiated the stop”; and (4) “the backpack that was found close to Hensley’s
position in the rear seat of the vehicle produced used needles.” (R., p.101.) The district court
determined, “Objectively viewed, these facts make[] it likely that Hensley was engaged in hiding
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evidence of drug use in the backpack, and render the other contents of that backpack irrelevant.”
(R., p.101.) The district court also determined, “as mandated by Zentner, the preceding facts
give rise to a reasonable probability that Hensley possessed both knowledge and control over the
contents of the backpack.” (R., p.101.) Further, the district court determined Officer Bloxham
“observed signs and symptoms indicating that Hensley was under the influence of a central
nervous stimulant, another important and relevant fact that was not present in Zentner.”
(R., p.101.)
The district court next determined, “These facts taken together are more than adequate to
give rise to a finding of probable cause on the part of law enforcement personnel sufficient to
sustain a lawful arrest.” (R., p.101.) While the search of Mr. Rosales-Hensley’s person occurred
before his arrest, the district court determined “the arrest was ‘substantially contemporaneous’
with the search, and the search was validly executed as a search incident to Hensley’s arrest.”
(R., p.101.) The district court denied Mr. Rosales-Hensley’s motion to suppress. (R., p.102.)
Pursuant to a binding plea agreement, Mr. Rosales-Hensley later agreed to plead guilty to
possession of a controlled substance, methamphetamine, and the parties agreed to recommend
that he be granted a withheld judgment and probation. (See R., pp.112-29.) Mr. RosalesHensley reserved the right to appeal the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress. (See
R., pp.114, 120.) The district court accepted Mr. Rosales-Hensley’s guilty plea. (See R., p.127.)
The district court subsequently granted Mr. Rosales-Hensley a withheld judgment and placed
him on probation for a period of three years. (R., pp.138-41.)
Mr. Rosales-Hensley filed a Notice of Appeal timely from the district court’s Minute
Entry & Judgment of Conviction. (R., pp.152-54.)
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ISSUE
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Rosales-Hensley’s motion to suppress?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Rosales-Hensley’s Motion To Suppress

A.

Introduction
Mr. Rosales-Hensley asserts the district court erred when it denied his motion to

suppress. The district court determined the warrantless search of Mr. Rosales-Hensley’s person
was a valid search incident to arrest. (See R., pp.95-101.) However, under the facts available at
the time of the search, the officers did not have probable cause to believe Mr. Rosales-Hensley
had constructive possession of the syringes in the backpack. Thus, the search of Mr. RosalesHensley’s person was not a valid search incident to arrest. Without an applicable exception to
the warrant requirement, the warrantless search violated Mr. Rosales-Hensley’s constitutional
right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, and the evidence obtained as a result of
the illegal search should have been suppressed.

B.

Standard Of Review And Applicable Law
“When this Court reviews a district court’s order granting or denying a motion to

suppress, the standard of review is bifurcated. The Court will accept the trial court’s findings of
fact unless they are clearly erroneous, but may freely review the trial court’s application of
constitutional principles in light of the facts found.” State v. Skurlock, 150 Idaho 404, 405
(2011) (citation omitted).
“The Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and article I, section 17 of the Idaho
Constitution each forbid unreasonable searches and seizures.” State v. Hansen, 151 Idaho 342,
346 (2011). “Searches and seizures without a valid warrant are presumptively unreasonable and,
therefore, illegal, unless they come within a recognized exception to the warrant requirement.”
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State v. Nunez, 138 Idaho 636, 640 (2003). “The burden of proof is on the state to show that the
search either fell within one of the well-recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement or was
otherwise reasonable under the circumstances.” State v. Smith, 144 Idaho 482, 485 (2007). “The
exclusionary rule is the judicial remedy for addressing illegal searches and bars the admission or
use of evidence gathered pursuant to the illegal search.” Nunez, 138 Idaho at 640.
“Searches incident to arrest are one of the well-established exceptions to the warrant
requirement.” State v. LaMay, 140 Idaho 835, 838 (2004). “Pursuant to the search incident to
arrest exception, law enforcement officers may search an arrestee incident to a lawful custodial
arrest.” State v. Lee, 162 Idaho 642, 649 (2017). “Further, so long as the search and arrest are
substantially contemporaneous, and the fruits of the search are not required to establish probable
cause for the arrest, the search need no precisely follow the arrest in order to be incident to that
arrest.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “An officer may perform a warrantless search
only incident to an arrest that is lawful.” Id. “In conformity with the rule at common law, a
warrantless arrest by a law officer is reasonable and lawful under the Fourth Amendment where
there is probable cause to believe that a criminal offense has been or is being committed.” Id.
(alteration and internal quotation marks omitted). Similarly, Idaho law provides that an officer
may conduct a warrantless arrest “[w]hen a felony has in fact been committed and he has
reasonable cause for believing the person arrested to have committed it.” I.C. § 19-603(3).
As the Idaho Supreme Court has held, “Reasonable or probable cause is the possession of
information that would lead a person of ordinary care and prudence to believe or entertain an
honest and strong presumption that such person is guilty.” State v. Julian, 129 Idaho 133, 136
(1996). “When reviewing an officer’s actions the court must judge the facts against an objective
standard. That is, would the facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure or search
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warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken was appropriate.” Id.
(alteration and internal quotation marks omitted).

C.

The Search of Mr. Rosales-Hensley’s Person Was Not A Valid Search Incident To
Arrest, Because The Officers Did Not Have Probable Cause To Believe He Had
Constructive Possession Of The Syringes In The Backpack
Mr. Rosales-Hensley asserts the search of his person was not a valid search incident to

arrest, because under the facts available at the time of the search, the officers did not have
probable cause to believe he had constructive possession of the syringes in the backpack.
The district court determined “the search of Hensley’s person was a search incident to a
lawful arrest.” (R., p.95.) The district court indicated the officers arrested Mr. Rosales-Hensley
based on the syringes in the backpack found in the rear seat of the car. (See R., p.98.) Thus, the
issue here, as recognized by the district court (see R., pp.95, 101), is whether the officers at the
time of the search had probable cause to believe Mr. Rosales-Hensley had constructive
possession of the syringes in the backpack.
Idaho law prohibits the possession, with intent to use, of drug paraphernalia. I.C. § 372734A(1). Possession may be either actual or constructive. See, e.g., State v. Blake, 133 Idaho
237, 242 (1999). As the district court suggested (see R., pp.100-01), while Mr. Rosales-Hensley
was in actual possession of the vial of methamphetamine he sought to suppress, the probable
cause for his arrest was based on constructive possession of the syringes in the backpack. To
have constructive possession of an item, a person must have knowledge of the item and the
power and intention to control it. See Blake, 133 Idaho at 242. “Constructive possession may be
joint or exclusive.” Id. “Control of the premises in which the drugs are found has often been
used to infer knowledge. Id. “However, such an inference cannot be made, absent other
circumstances, where the accused does not have exclusive possession of the premises.” Id.
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In State v. Zentner, 134 Idaho 508 (Ct. App. 2000), the case relied upon by the district
court (see R., pp.97-99), the Idaho Court of Appeals held a deputy had probable cause to believe
the defendant, as the backseat passenger in a stopped vehicle, had constructive possession of the
drugs in a backpack found in the backseat, and the deputy’s arrest of the defendant was lawful.
See Zentner, 134 Idaho at 510-11. The Zentner Court noted: “Zentner’s arrest was predicated on
the drugs contained in a backpack that was lying next to him on the backseat. Thus, on Zentner’s
suppression motion it was incumbent upon the State to show that Deputy Melton had probable
cause to believe that Zentner had constructive possession of the drugs.” Id. The Court also
articulated that constructive possession “exists where a nexus between the accused and the
controlled substance is sufficiently proven so as to give rise to the reasonable inference that the
accused was not simply a bystander but, rather, had the power and the intent to exercise
domination and control over the drugs.” Id. (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted).
The Zentner Court then concluded, based on “the uncontroverted facts presented here . . .
that the district court correctly held that Deputy Melton had probable cause to arrest Zentner for
possession of the drugs in the backpack.” Id. at 511. The Court stated, “Suspicious behavior by
a suspect when he becomes aware of a law enforcement officer’s presence is a circumstance that
can link him to drugs found on premises of which he is in non-exclusive possession.” Id. (citing
State v. Greene, 100 Idaho 464, 466 (1979); State v. Gomez, 126 Idaho 700, 706 (Ct. App.
1994)).
The facts known to the officers in Zentner at the time of the arrest included “the
proximity of the backpack to Zentner as he was situated in the backseat of the vehicle,” as well
as “Deputy Kinsley’s observation, while attempting to stop the vehicle, that all three occupants
were moving excessively about the interior of the car for a period before the driver finally
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brought the vehicle to a stop.” Id. According to the Court, “From this excessive activity,
followed by the discovery of drugs in the automobile, an officer could reasonably infer that all of
the occupants had been taking steps to conceal the contraband in the car.” Id. Further, “This
evidence, together with Zentner’s physical position on the seat next to the backpack, would lead
a prudent person to entertain an honest and strong suspicion that Zentner had knowledge and
control of the contraband in the backpack.” Id. Thus, the Zentner Court held the arrest of the
defendant was lawful, and that evidence discovered in his post-arrest search was not subject to
suppression. Id.
About three years after Zentner, the United States Supreme Court in Maryland v. Pringle,
540 U.S. 366 (2003), held a police officer had probable cause to believe the defendant, who was
the front-seat passenger in a stopped vehicle, had constructive possession of cocaine found in the
back seat of the vehicle. See id. at 368-69, 371-72. The Pringle Court framed the sole question
as whether the officer had probable cause to believe that the defendant committed the crime of
possession of controlled dangerous substances, and observed Maryland law recognized both
actual and constructive possession. See id. at 370 & n.1.
On the historical facts of the case, the Pringle Court explained the defendant “was one of
three men riding in a Nissan Maxima at 3:16 am.” Id. at 371. “There was $763 of rolled-up cash
in the glove compartment directly in front of Pringle.” Id. at 371-72. Further, “Five plastic
glassine baggies of cocaine were behind the back-seat armrest and accessible to all three men.”
Id. at 372. “Upon questioning, the three men failed to offer any information with respect to the
ownership of the cocaine or the money.” Id.
The Pringle Court held: “We think it an entirely reasonable inference from these facts
that any or all three of the occupants had knowledge of, and exercised dominion and control
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over, the cocaine. Thus, a reasonable officer could conclude that there was probable cause to
believe Pringle committed the crime of possession of cocaine, either solely or jointly.” Id. The
Court distinguished the matter from “guilt-by-association” cases, concluding it was reasonable
for the officer to infer a common enterprise among the three men in the car, and there was no
singling out of the guilty person because none of the three men provided information on the
ownership of the cocaine or money. See id. at 372-74 (citing Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85
(1979); United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581 (1948)). The Pringle Court held “that the officer
had probable cause to believe that Pringle had committed the crime of possession of a controlled
substance.

Pringle’s arrest therefore did not contravene the Fourth and Fourteenth

Amendments.” Id. at 374.
Here, under the facts available at the time of the search of Mr. Rosales-Hensley’s person,
the officers did not have probable cause to believe he had constructive possession of the syringes
in the backpack.

At the time of the search, the facts known to the officers included:

(1) Mr. Randall was the driver of the car, Ms. Beach was the front passenger and Mr. RosalesHensley was the passenger in the backseat; (2) Officer McClure saw the passengers moving
around quite a bit in the car during the stop; (3) Officer Bloxham, at the time she questioned
Mr. Rosales-Hensley, thought he appeared to be under the influence of a central nervous system
stimulant; (4) the drug detection dog alerted on the car; (5) officers found a hypodermic syringe,
containing a liquid that tested presumptively positive for methamphetamine, in the car’s glove
compartment; (6) officers found used syringes in a backpack that contained mostly women’s
clothing and was located in the rear seat next to Mr. Rosales-Hensley; and (7) none of the
passengers admitted to possessing the drugs and paraphernalia. (See R., pp.93-94, 101.)
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An important difference between the circumstances in the present case and the
circumstances in Zentner and Pringle is that the backpack containing the syringes here mostly
contained women’s clothing. (See R., p.94.) With Ms. Beach being the only woman in the car
(see R., p.93), the presence of women’s clothing in the backpack connected the syringes to her,
not to Mr. Rosales-Hensley. While the district court determined the facts made it “likely that
Hensley was engaged in hiding evidence of drug use in the backpack, and render the other
contents of that backpack irrelevant” (see R., p.101), determining whether probable cause for an
arrest exists requires an examination of all of the facts available at the time, see Pringle, 540
U.S. at 371; Julian, 129 Idaho at 136. Rather than being rendered irrelevant by the other facts,
the presence of women’s clothing in the backpack was a fact available at the time of the search,
which would help counter the existence of probable cause to arrest Mr. Rosales-Hensley.
Moreover, Ms. Beach’s position as the front passenger put her in closest proximity out of
any of the car’s occupants to the syringe containing methamphetamine in the glove compartment.
(See R., pp.93-94.) That fact similarly connected the drugs and paraphernalia initially found to
her, not to Mr. Rosales-Hensley.
Considering all the facts available to the officers at the time of the search, the information
would not have led them to believe or entertain an honest and strong presumption that
Mr. Rosales-Hensley was guilty of possessing the syringes in the backpack. See Julian, 129
Idaho at 136. The officers knew that Mr. Rosales-Hensley had moved around in the car during
the stop, he appeared to be under the influence of a central nervous system stimulant, and he did
not admit to possessing the drugs or paraphernalia found. (See R., pp.93-94.) Taking those facts
in combination with the facts tending not to connect him with the syringes found in the
backpack, the objective facts here would not warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief
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that the arrest of Mr. Rosales-Hensley was appropriate. See Julian, 129 Idaho at 136. Thus, the
officers did not have probable cause to believe Mr. Rosales-Hensley had constructive possession
of the syringes in the backpack.
Because the officers did not have the requisite probable cause, the search of Mr. RosalesHensley’s person was not a valid search incident to arrest. See Lee, 162 Idaho at 649. Without
an applicable exception to the warrant requirement, the warrantless search violated Mr. RosalesHensley’s constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, and the
evidence obtained as a result of the illegal search should have been suppressed. See Nunez, 138
Idaho at 640. The district court erred when it denied Mr. Rosales-Hensley’s motion to suppress.

CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, Mr. Rosales-Hensley respectfully requests that this Court vacate
the district court’s order withholding judgment and reverse the order which denied his motion
to suppress.
DATED this 26th day of March, 2019.

/s/ Ben P. McGreevy
BEN P. MCGREEVY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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